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on a very preliminary version.   
1. Introduction 
This paper uses quantile regression as introduced in Koenker and Bassett (1978) to 
investigate heterogeneity in the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance.  There 
have been hundreds of papers published on executive compensation in the past 20 years in 
economics, finance, human resource management, and accounting.  A great deal of these have 
focused on the relationship between the compensation of the top manager and the size of the 
firm or between the compensation of the top manager and the performance of the firm.  Most, 
however, have focused on the estimated mean relationship.  This paper will use some examples 
to show that the mean returns mask substantial heterogeneity in the CEO pay and firm 
performance relationship.   
 Murphy’s (1985) work helped start a surge of interest in this area.  Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) found that CEO wealth changes were only weakly related to firm value changes, and the 
link was probably too low to provide meaningful management incentives.  Hall and Liebman 
(1998) showed that since stock options are such an important part of managerial pay, the value 
of options are obviously related to firm value, and there is a link between managerial pay and 
firm performance. 
 Most of the important research on the pay versus firm performance relationship has 
been concentrated on the conditional mean effect.  Some researchers have considered median 
regression (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) but most are still fundamentally interested in 
“central tendency” effects.   Others, like Conyon and Schwalbach (2000), have explicitly pointed 
out that there may be a different pay-for-performance sensitivity for each firm.   Baker and Hall 
(2004) and Schaefer (1998) have made important contributions to the relationship between firm 
size and pay-for-performance sensitivities (as detailed below).  However, they do not employ 
quantile regression to document heterogeneity. 
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 We take a much different approach by explicitly using quantile regression to examine 
the relationship between the compensation of the top manager and the performance of the firm.  
The main question we seek to answer is:  Does the pay-for-performance relationship differ 
across the conditional distribution of wages of top managers?  That is, do conditionally 
(predicted) high-wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance 
than conditionally low-wage managers?  Although the focus of this work is to document 
empirical heterogeneity, we also consider some different reasons and explanations for why 
heterogeneity may exist in pay-for-performance sensitivities and assess whether our results 
coincide with these explanations.  Further work could consider heterogeneity in different 
empirical specifications to disentangle the theories.   
 
2. Managerial pay and firm performance 
 In this section, we briefly summarize selection of papers on executive compensation as 
the baseline for our work, focusing on several main areas.  First, we consider some of the 
background literature on firm size and pay and performance for CEOs.  Second, we consider 
some data issues.  Third, we consider some empirical specifications for pay and performance.  
There is substantial disagreement on this in the literature.  For purposes of illustration in this 
paper, we consider two examples: one concerned with firm size and one with firm performance.  
Fourth, we introduce the idea of considering heterogeneity by using quantile regression.  This 
last issue is explored more deeply in the latter half of the paper. 
2.1  Pay and performance1  
 Following a great deal of theoretical work in the area of incentive compensation and 
executive compensation,2 a substantial amount of literature on the empirics of executive 
                                                 
1 This section relies heavily on the introduction to Hallock and Murphy (1999). 
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compensation started in the middle of the 1980s.  Rosen (1992) provides a clear and careful 
introduction to the theory and empirical work in this area. 
 An earlier study by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) , along with many of the earlier 
authors, examine whether pay is more closely tied with company profits or company size.  
Using data on the 50 top companies from the early 1940s through the early 1960s, Lewellen and 
Hunstman (1970) found that company profits are at least as important as revenues for the firms 
they studied.   
 Murphy (1985) examined the pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., the relation between 
executive pay and returns to shareholders) using a panel data sample on 73 large 
manufacturing firms from 1964 through 1981.  Although many cross-sectional studies found no 
relation between executive pay and firm performance, Murphy (1985) showed that simply using 
firm fixed effects (and therefore looking within firms) reveals a strong and statistically 
significant link between pay and performance.  This was the first paper to make clear the 
importance of firm fixed effects in the empirical CEO-pay literature.  Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) also investigated changes in cash pay and firm performance using data from the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  Like Murphy, they found a positive pay-for-performance link.  They went on 
to show that there is a negative relationship between CEO turnover and company performance. 
 Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEO wealth changes (from a variety of sources) 
are only weakly related to wealth changes for shareholders of firms.  They concluded that the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity may be too low to provide meaningful incentives for managers. 
 In an interesting and more recent paper, Schaefer (1998) investigated the dependence of 
the pay-for-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm.  Among his specific findings, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This includes papers by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
Grossman and Hart (1983), Fama (1980), and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). 
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pay-for-performance sensitivity may be inversely proportional to the square root of firm size.   
Baker and Hall (2004) went on to consider the large differences in pay-and-performance 
sensitivities between small and large firms.  They showed that a very important feature is the 
elasticity of CEO productivity with respect to firm size. 
 Another paper is that of Hall and Liebman (1998) who show the enormous increase in 
the use of stock options for senior managers over more than two decades.  They also document 
that the relationship between CEO wealth changes and firm performance is very strong, which 
obviously makes sense because of the recent trend in managerial compensation in the form of 
stock options. 
2.2  CEO pay and pay-for-performance:  An empirical specification 
 Given the hundreds of papers on executive compensation written in the past 20 years, it 
is startling that there is not some sort of convergence on a standard empirical specification.  This 
may have to do with differences in fields (e.g., Core, 2002; Engel, Gordon, and Hayes, 2002, in 
accounting), a specific focus on corporate governance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988), or specific issues 
such as timing (e.g., Hallock and Oyer, 1999).  This paper does not focus on the issue of sorting 
out the set of empirical specifications.  Rather, it focuses primarily on one that is well-known 
and commonly used (Murphy, 1986). 
 Similar to Murphy (1999), the basic idea is to consider an equation of the following form: 
 itiiitit tvaluefirmoncompensati εγαβ +++= )ln()ln(  (1) 
where i represents firms and t represents time in years. 
There are many other decisions for the researchers to make, such as whether to measure 
pay in levels or logs and exactly how to measure performance (e.g. should it be lagged).  
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Another consideration in the context of panel data is whether first differences or fixed effects 
should be used. 
 In equation (1), we fundamentally seek an estimate of β .  However, it is easy to see that 
an estimate of β  from OLS is likely biased due to the fact that .0≠iγ  Suppose for the moment 
that iγ represents the “quality” of the CEO or some other unmeasured (but for the purposes of 
this discussion, positive) firm or manager characteristic.  Then if we ignore iγ in our estimation 
of (1), then β will be upward biased.  
 One way to eliminate this bias due to the unobserved variable iγ is to “difference” the 
data.  Differencing (1) yields the following: 
 
1
11
)1(
)ln()ln()ln()ln(
−
−−
−+−+−−+
−=−
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itititit
tt
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(2) 
  
If we let Δ represent the change from year to year, this can be re-written as: 
1))1(()ln()ln( −−+−−+Δ=Δ ititiitit ttvaluefirmoncompensati εεαβ  
or 
 
 
(3) 
 ititit valuefirmoncompensati ηβθ +Δ+=Δ )ln()ln( , (4) 
where 1−−= ititit εεη  and iii tt αααθ =−−= )1()( , which is a constant.  Equation (4) is exactly 
Murphy’s (1986) specification.  However, the β being estimated can be compared to the 
coefficient on firm value in equation (1) once the unmeasured effect, iγ , is removed.  This is 
important for the discussion below. 
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 We investigate the specification in equation (4) below.  We additionally want to explore 
heterogeneity through the use of quantile regression which we begin to discuss in the next sub-
section but explain more fully, and with empirical examples, in Section II. 
2.3  An additional issue 
 Obviously, there are many ways to consider the pay-for-performance sensitivity using 
least-squares regression.  The point of this paper, however, is to discover whether there is 
heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance sensitivity within a particular empirical specification.  
This will be done by simply extending the simple empirical model to quantile regression.  This 
will allow the pay-for-performance sensitivities to vary across the conditional distribution of 
wages (as explained in more detail below). 
 There are several possible reasons why heterogeneity in CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivities may exist.  Suppose, for example, that CEOs have different “ability” (or motivation, 
organization, etc.) levels such that the marginal return from effort increases with ability.  Firms 
would want to offer incentive-based contracts to high-ability CEOs to maximize effort, and high 
ability CEOs would want to work for firms offering incentive-based contracts to maximize 
earnings.  However, if costs of effort by managers are constant (or costs decrease with ability), 
then low-ability CEOs would prefer fixed-wage contracts from firms where the costs of effort 
outweigh the return from extra effort.  This situation would generate heterogeneity in pay-for-
performance sensitivities since incentive contracts would differ by the ability level of the CEO, 
with higher-ability managers having higher pay-for-performance incentives than low-ability 
managers. 
 Other examples of sources of heterogeneity in pay-for-performance sensitivities can be 
derived from a simple principle-agent model as in Murphy (1999).  Suppose that firm value is 
made up of two parts:  value created by effort from the CEO and a random noise term.  Also 
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suppose that contracts are made up of two parts:  a fixed wage portion and a portion that ties 
pay to performance of the firm.  Given this basic structure, and making some simplifying 
assumptions about utility and costs of effort, several sources of heterogeneity in pay for 
performance sensitivities can be explored.  Differences in risk across firms (in this case, variance 
of returns) will lead to heterogeneity, with more risky firms showing smaller pay-for-
performance sensitivities than less risky firms.  Another source of heterogeneity is the 
difference in risk aversion across managers, with more-risk averse CEOs tending to have 
smaller pay-for-performance sensitivities than less-risk averse CEOs.  This paper mainly focuses 
on empirically documenting heterogeneity in the pay-performance link and not in testing 
alternative theories. 
 
3. Quantile regression basics and the start of our empirical specification 
 This section provides a brief introduction to quantile regression.3  It is also designed to 
help avoid a common pitfall in thinking about quantile regression by describing what quantile 
regression is not.  In the third sub-section, we describe why quantile regression may be so useful 
in the context of executive compensation. 
3.1  An example of something that is not quantile regression 
We have encountered some confusion over the interpretation of and how to implement 
quantile regression.   The example below of a mistaken interpretation illustrates potential 
problems.  First, consider the top left plot in Figure 1, which is simply a plot of Log 
Compensation and Log Assets for 1,633 CEOs using EXECUCOMP data (described in more 
detail below) for the year 2004.  It also plots the slope of the OLS regression line of Log 
Compensation on Log Assets through the data. 
                                                 
3 See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for an introduction to quantile regression. 
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In this example, we take the data on the compensation of 1,633 CEOs and their assets 
from the top left plot in Figure 1.  We then break the data into five separate groups by sorting 
on the dependent variable (the data are simply grouped into five subsets based on the level of 
the dependent variable -- e.g., 10% of the sample with the smallest level of CEO compensation, 
then 10% of the sample with the level of CEO compensation from 20%-30%, then 10% of the 
sample with the level of compensation from 40%-50%, the 10% of the sample with the level of 
CEO compensation from 60%-80% and finally 10% of the sample with the level of CEO 
compensation from 90%-100%, and so on).  We then run five separate Ordinary Least Squares 
Regressions of Log Compensation on Log Assets.  This is potentially interesting if one is 
concerned with only those CEOs earning a particular level of wages.  However, it is not quantile 
regression.  In fact, this sort of truncating on the dependent variable could lead to misleading 
results, as is clear below. 
Reading the rest of Figure 1 from left to right, the 2nd through the 6th graphs represent 
the five subsets of the data as truncated on the dependent variable.  Within each graph, an OLS 
regression line is fitted through the data.  It is clear from the second graph in Figure 2 that the 
simple relationship between pay and firm size for the lowest 10% of CEOs (in terms of pay) is 
barely positive.  It is also clear that for the highest 10% of CEOs (in terms of pay), the 
relationship between Log Pay and Log Assets is more strongly positive.  This information is 
summarized in the final plot in Figure 1, which graphs the slope of the least squares line against 
each of the five pay-level groups.  While potentially interesting for certain subsets of the data, 
this is not quantile regression. 
3.2  What is quantile regression? 
 We now turn to a simple discussion of quantile regression.  When a CEO is at the τ th 
percentile (or quantile) of compensation in his industry, a fraction (1 - τ ) of CEOs in the 
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industry are paid more than he is.  If he is at the 5th percentile, 95% of CEOs are paid more; if he 
is at the median, then only half are paid more.  Koenker and Bassett (1978) extended these ideas 
to conditional quantile functions, where quantiles of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable are expressed as functions of the observed independent variables. 
 Standard OLS regression is used to obtain estimates for the conditional mean of some 
variable, given some set of covariates.  One drawback of this approach is that the estimate 
obtained is only one number used to summarize the relationship between the dependent 
variable and each of the independent variables.  In particular, this method assumes that the 
conditional distribution is homogenous.  This would imply that no matter where you analyze 
the conditional distribution, the estimates of the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variable are assumed to be the same. 
 Quantile regression, on the other hand, allows for different estimates to be calculated at 
different points on the conditional distribution.  In other words, no assumptions about the 
homogeneity of the conditional distribution are needed in quantile regression and, in fact, 
quantile regression can be used to show that the conditional distribution may not be 
homogenous.  If estimates at different quantiles are found to be significantly different from one 
another, then the conditional distribution is not homogenous.   
 To be more explicit about the differences between quantile regression and OLS 
regression, recall that for OLS, we minimize the following with respect to β : 
 ∑
=
−=
n
i
ii XySSE
1
2' )( β  (5) 
where y is the dependent variable (in our case the log of CEO total annual compensation), X is a 
matrix of covariates, and β is a vector of coefficients.  This will give the standard estimates for 
the conditional mean of y given X. 
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 Quantile regression minimizes not the sum of squared errors, but rather an 
asymmetrically weighted sum of absolute errors.  Specifically, minimized as: 
 [ ]))(()1())(()()( ''
1
' τβττβττβ iiii
n
i
ii XyIXyIXy ≤−+>⋅−∑
=
 
(6) 
where y is the dependent variable, X is a matrix of covariates, β is a vector of coefficients which 
now depends on τ , the quantile being estimated (e.g., τ = 0.5 is the median), and the function I 
is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the condition in the parentheses is true and 0 
otherwise.  The formula in equation (6) gives weight τ to any observations that are above their 
respective predicted values and 1 - τ weight to any observations that are below their respective 
predicted values.  This is the same as saying that positive residuals are given weightτ  and 
negative residuals are given weight 1 - τ .  A special case of this function is conditional median 
regression where τ = 0.5, since equation (6) collapses to minimizing: 
 ∑
=
−
n
i
ii Xy
1
'β  (7) 
which is the standard method for conditional median regression. 
 Using equation (6), one can estimate )(τβ for any given level of τ between 0 and 1.  
Thus, we are not making the assumption that estimates at all points on the conditional 
distribution are the same (as in OLS) since estimates for )(τβ explicitly depend on the point of 
the conditional distribution being estimated (τ ). 
 To reiterate, quantile regression is not the same as dividing the data into different 
percentiles (or groups) and then running OLS on each percentile.  Cutting the data in this way 
and then calculating separate estimates means that not all of the data are being used for each 
estimate (since only the data from a given group will be used).   For each quantile regression 
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estimate, all of the data are being used.  However, some observations get more weight than 
others. 
 We can see that quantile regression is a simple extension of the analysis already 
presented in Figure 1.  In the top left plot in Figure 1, we graphed a single OLS regression line 
through the simple cross-section of data from the year 2004 as follows: 
 iii assetsoncompensati εβ += )ln()ln(  (8) 
and our estimate of βˆ = 0.377.   There has been a long history of literature on this simple 
relationship between log compensation for managers and log firm size.  This literature has 
always assumed that there was one return to firm size (e.g., Rosen, 1992).  Quantile regression 
helps us consider if the return might vary along the conditional distribution of wages.  In a 
simple quantile regression case, we extend this as follows: 
 iii assetsoncompensati εβτ += )ln()ln(  
where we can estimate separate τβˆ for any particular quantile.  In the case of Figure 2, we do 
this for τ = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50 (the median regression), 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, and 0.90.  Although 
the corresponding quantile regression lines in the left panel of Figure 2 look very similar, they 
are not exactly so.  In fact, 10.0ˆ =τβ = 0.343, 20.0ˆ =τβ = 0.361, 30.0ˆ =τβ = 0.359, 40.0ˆ =τβ = 0.366, 50.0ˆ =τβ = 
0.370, 60.0ˆ =τβ = 0.360, 70.0ˆ =τβ = 0.362, 80.0ˆ =τβ = 0.359, and 90.0ˆ =τβ = 0.362.  These coefficients are 
plotted against their respective quantiles (along with the horizontal OLS estimate) in the right-
hand panel of Figure 2.  Clearly, the slopes increase sharply as we go from the 0.10 quantile up 
to the median, and then decline as we go further in the conditional distribution of wages.  The 
horizontal line in the right-hand panel of Figure 2 represents the OLS estimate.  It is clear that 
there is substantial heterogeneity around this estimate. 
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3.3  Why use quantile regression now and in this context? 
 Quantile regression may be particularly useful in this context for several reasons.  First, 
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the levels of and changes in compensation across firm 
types.  Similarly, there is wide variation in firm size, however measured, even within the 
EXECUCOMP sample used here and described below.  This is one of the chief reasons for the 
confusion over the standard empirical specification for thinking about CEO pay and firm 
performance.  Second, although the techniques of quantile regression have existed for some 
time, there is now rapid growth in applications.  Finally, other researchers (e.g.,  Schaefer, 1998; 
Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Baker and Hall, 2004) have shown that there are some 
differences in pay for performance sensitivities by different firm characteristics (e.g., firm size).   
 Quantile regression will allow us to use all of the data at once and to consider whether 
there is heterogeneity in the pay-and-performance relationship across the conditional 
distribution of wages. 
 
4. The data 
 In this section, we describe the data and simple descriptive statistics.  The data used 
here, from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP, are now commonly used in the literature on 
executive compensation.   
4.1  Basic data description and positive features 
 The data used in this work are from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP from 1992-2004.  
There are several useful features of these data.  First, the data include detailed information on 
the compensation of the top five highest paid executives over the thirteen-year period.   We 
focus our attention on the Chief Executive Officer of each firm.  Second, the data set is large and 
contains information from about 1,500 firms for each of the thirteen years of the sample.  Third, 
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since the data contain information from a wide variety of firms (Standard & Poor’s 500-stock 
index, Standard & Poor’s Mid-Cap 400, and SmallCap 600 there is considerable variation in firm 
size which will prove useful.   
4.2  Sample descriptive statistics 
 We consider 17,403 CEO-year observations in the main part of our analysis.  Table 1 
shows that for the entire sample period, the median CEO had salary and bonus of $750,000 and 
total compensation (including the Black-Scholes value of stock options at the time of grant) of 
$1,688,000.  Median sales in these firms is $908 million, and the median market value of equity 
in the firms is $1.03 billion.  Descriptive statistics for all variables in each of the years from 1992 
– 2004 are also reported in Table 1. 
 
5. Is there heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance relationship? 
 Although it is clear from the right-hand panel of Figure 2 that there is heterogeneity in 
the return to firm size (as measured by assets), this section is specifically focused on considering 
heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance relationship.  We do this by simply extending the 
model introduced in Section 2.2 to the quantile regression context.  We then compute the return 
across the quantiles of the conditional distribution of compensation for the managers. 
5.1  Heterogeneity in Murphy’s (1986) specification? 
 A very well-known specification we investigate is that of Murphy (1986).  We have only 
slightly modified this specification so that the pay-for-performance sensitivity ( β ) can vary by 
the quantiles,τ .  We denote this in equation (10) as tβ   
 ititit valuefirmoncompensati ηβθ τ +Δ+=Δ )ln()ln(  (10) 
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Table 2 presents the results from ten different estimates of the pay-for-performance relationship 
with the change in the natural log of salary and bonus plus the value of options granted in a 
given year as the dependent variable.  The numbers for the quantile regression estimates can be 
interpreted as conditional on a set of covariates: if a CEO is expected to lie in the τ-th quantile of 
the wage distribution, then the estimated pay for performance sensitivity equals βτ.  For 
example, the coefficient estimate on change in shareholder value in Table 2 for the 10% quantile 
implies that given the set of covariates, a CEO in the 10th percentile of the conditional wage 
distribution is expected to have a pay-for-performance sensitivity of -0.0074.  It is clear that the 
OLS ( β  = 0.0673) and median regression ( 50.0=τβ = 0.0580) estimates are somewhat similar.  
However, it is also clear that as the quantiles increase so do the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities.  This is easily seen in Figure 3, which plots each of the ten quantile regression 
estimates from Table 2 (along with the 95% confidence intervals).  From this picture we can see 
that conditionally low-wage CEOs have a smaller pay-for-performance sensitivity than 
conditionally high-wage CEOs.4  If we assume that conditionally high-wage CEOs are typically 
“higher quality managers,” then these results would suggest that firms tie CEO pay with 
performance more tightly when the CEO is of higher quality.  This could make sense since 
higher quality CEOs would tend to give the firm high return on their effort.  Therefore, 
inducing higher effort from the CEO by linking pay to firm performance would outweigh the 
cost to the firm of monitoring CEO effort if the CEO is high quality.  These results would also 
suggest that linking pay to performance for low-conditional-wage CEOs may not be as 
profitable for the firm for similar reasons.  The results in Table 2 would also coincide with the 
explanation suggested in section I.C, where high ability CEOs have higher pay-for-performance 
                                                 
4 This discussion supposes that β measures the relationship between compensation and firm value.  This 
is exactly what equation (10) is doing since (10) is just a variant of (1) with the unobserved fixed effect, iγ , 
removed.  Differencing as in either (4) or (10) is essentially running a fixed-effects model like (1). 
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sensitivities than low ability CEOs if ability is positively related to conditional wages.  This is 
likely to be the case but cannot be formally tested in this setting without some measure for 
ability.  In order for these results to match an explanation based on risk aversion, one would 
have to argue that high-conditional-wage CEOs tend to have lower risk aversion than low-
conditional-wage CEOs.  Since we doubt that it is the case that risk aversion differs in this way 
across CEOs, we cannot say whether this explanation for heterogeneity is valid given our 
results. 
 The next obvious question is whether the returns to performance differ significantly 
across quantiles.  For example, in specification (10), we get 10.0=τβ = -0.0074 and 50.0=τβ = 0.0580.  
The general procedure for hypothesis testing used here to establish a case for heterogeneity is 
based on the work of Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Hendricks and Koenker (1991).  Tests of 
hypotheses that take the form H0:  21 ττ ββ =  against H1: 21 ττ ββ ≠ can be written as: 
 )ˆˆ()()ˆˆ( 21
111'
21 ττττ ββββ −−= −−− JHHTn  (11) 
where H-1JH-1 is the “sandwich” formula used in Hendricks and Koenker (1991).  This test has 
an asymptotic F distribution when it is divided by its degrees of freedom.  This form of the test 
can be used to either test a vector of coefficients across a pair of quantiles or to test a single 
coefficient across a pair of quantiles.  In the case of a single coefficient, this statistic simplifies to: 
 
)ˆ,ˆ(2)ˆ()ˆ(
)()ˆˆ(
2,1,2,1,
2,1,2,1,
ττττ
ττττ
ββββ
ββββ
pppp
pppp
n
CovVV
T
−+
−−−=  
(12) 
where p is the variable of interest and ip τβ , (where i = 1,2) is the coefficient estimate at a given 
quantile for the variable.  This version of the formula may be a bit more intuitive since it looks 
similar to the standard tests for differences in means.  Instead of using this form to test for 
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differences in means, we are using a similar procedure to test for differences in conditional 
quantile estimates. 
 These tests can be used to establish a case for heterogeneity because if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, we can conclude that there are significant differences across quantiles.  
Given that these differences are significant, this would suggest that there is evidence that the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity is different at different points in the conditional distribution 
(i.e., there is significant heterogeneity in pay-for-performance sensitivities across the conditional 
wage distribution). 
Table 3 shows the results of tests for significant differences for all possible cases outlined 
in Table 2.  For example, the F-statistic for testing whether there is a significant difference 
between 1.0=τβ and  5.0=τβ is 28.320, which is significant at the 1% level.  In fact, all of the 
coefficients are significantly different from one another.  This implies that significant 
heterogeneity exists in pay-for-performance sensitivities using the Murphy (1986) specification. 
5.2  Relation with other pay-for-performance work 
 Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) also investigate a type of heterogeneity in the pay-for-
performance relationship using data from the UK and Germany, but they do not use quantile 
regression.  Instead, the authors estimate a separate pay-for-performance sensitivity for every 
firm in their data set, and then consider the distribution of those estimates.  In other words, they 
examine the distribution across firms of conditional mean estimates of within-firm pay-for-
performance sensitivities.   Using our data, we use a similar method in Figure 4 to document the 
types of differences in sensitivities pointed out by Conyon and Schwalbach in the UK and 
Germany.  We ran specifications like equation (4) (analogous to Figure 3 and Tables 2 and 3) 
1,585 times.  The 1,585 represents the number of firms for which we have data for three 
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consecutive years.  In Figure 4, we plot the distribution of within-firm returns,5 with 4.2% 
(median 6.1%) with wide variability. 
 Though our example of the Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) method shows a form of 
heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance relationship, this is not the same as the heterogeneity 
shown using quantile regression.  The estimates from the quantile regressions used in our paper 
suggest heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance sensitivity across the conditional distribution 
of wages, not across firms, as in Conyon and Schwalbach. 
 Other recent work on the firm size effect and CEO pay include Baker and Hall (2004) 
and Schaefer (1998).  Baker and Hall find that firm size has different effects on different 
measures of CEO incentives, and they attempt to show under which circumstances each 
measure of incentives should be used for analysis.  Specifically, they find that if activities have 
dollar impact that is the same across different firm sizes, then the measure of CEO incentives 
should be the CEO’s “percent owned”; and if activities have percentage returns that are 
constant across firm size, then the CEO’s “equity stake” should be used.  Schaefer (1998) 
develops a model based on agency theory that includes both costs of effort by the CEO and risk 
aversion and uses this model to examine the effect of firm size on pay-for-performance 
sensitivities.  He finds that pay-for-performance sensitivity is inversely proportional to the 
square root of firm size, independent of how firm size is measured.  Rather than distinguishing 
among different theories of compensation, our goal is to empirically examine executive pay 
using quantile regression.  Our hope is that quantile regression techniques will ultimately be 
helpful in contributing to this literature as well. 
 
 
                                                 
5 2.6% of the returns are outside of the bounds in the figure. 
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6. Concluding comments and future work 
 There is a lot of interesting literature on the economics of executive compensation.  
Much of this work has concentrated on the relationship between the pay of the top manager 
and the performance of the firm.  Even more recent work has suggested that the relationship 
between pay and performance in firms is not constant across all firm types (e.g., Schaefer, 1998; 
Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Baker and Hall, 2004).  
 This paper uses quantile regression techniques developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) 
to investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the pay-for-performance link across the 
conditional distribution of wages for managers of U.S. firms over the years 1992 – 2004.  The 
results suggest that for some commonly used specifications in the literature, there is 
considerable heterogeneity in returns to firm performance across the conditional distribution of 
wages.  But what is the fundamental source of this heterogeneity?  There are several possible 
sources, such as firm risk, firm beta, managerial ability, managerial risk aversion, and the shape 
of the firm’s age-wage profiles.  Each of these is a potential fruitful area for future work. 
 These ideas can be extended to many other areas.  One is in the area of management 
turnover.  The theory of quantile regression has only recently been extended to the case of 
binary response variables (Kordas, 2000).  With this, ideas from the extensive literature on CEO 
turnover could be explored in the quantile regression context.  Another area of interest is 
relative performance evaluation of CEOs.  We expect that quantile regression will continue to be 
used in these and many other interesting areas.
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Figure 1.  Least squares fit on unconditional subsets of the response variable 
 
These panels highlight that quantile regression is not ranking the data by levels of the dependent variable and then running separate 
regressions.  The top left figure contains 1,633 observations of Log total CEO compensation plotted against Log Assets from the year 
2004.  An OLS regression line is plotted through the data.  In the next five panels, the data are simply grouped into five subsets based 
on the level of the dependent variable (e.g., 10% of the sample with the smallest level of CEO compensation, then 10% of the sample 
with the level of CEO compensation from 20%-30%, then 10% of the sample with the level of compensation from 40%-50%, the 10% 
of the sample with the level of CEO compensation from 60%-80% and finally 10% of the sample with the level of CEO compensation 
from 90%-100%, and so on).  The data “rises” as the figures are read left to right and down.  In each of these five panels there is an 
OLS regression line plotted through the data.  The final panel (bottom left) shows the slopes from the previous five plots in the 
figure.  Compensation includes salary, bonus, and the value of options granted (at the time of the grant and according to Black-
Scholes).  The data are from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP. 
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Figure 2.  Quantile regressions of log compensation on log assets 
 
The left-hand panel contains 1,633 observations of Log total CEO compensation plotted against Log assets from the year 2004.  
Quantile regression lines from nine quantile regressions (at 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, and 0.90) are plotted through 
the data in the left-hand panel of the figure (the 10th quantile is the bottom line all the way up to the 90th which is the top line).  The 
right-hand figure depicts the nine slopes on Log Assets from the nine quantile regressions, along with the least squares line 
(horizontal).  Compensation includes salary, bonus, and the value of options granted (at the time of the grant and according to Black-
Scholes).  The data come from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP. 
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Figure 3.  Quantile regression estimates of τβ   
The empirical model estimated is itit valuefirmoncompensati )ln()ln( Δ+=Δ τβθ .  Compensation includes salary, bonus, and the 
value of options granted (at the time of the grant and according to Black-Scholes).  The horizontal lines represent the OLS estimate 
and the 95% confidence intervals.  The dots represent the nine quantile regression estimates and corresponding confidence intervals.  
Data are from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP, 1992-2004.   
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Figure 4.  Within-firm OLS regressions of pay-size link 
The empirical model estimated is itit )valuefirmln()oncompensatiln( Δβ+θ=Δ .  This is estimated 1,585 times, once for each of 1,585 
firms for which we have three consecutive years of data.  The histogram in the figure is the graph of each of the 1,585 within-firm 
βˆ coefficients.   Compensation includes salary, bonus, plus the value of options granted (at the time of the grant and according to 
Black-Scholes).  The data are from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP. 
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 Table 1.  Summary statistics, medians 
 
Median statistics for companies and CEOs are reported overall and by year from 1992-2004.  Data are presented on salary and bonus, total compensation (including the 
value of options granted), sales, assets market value and return on assets).  All data in table are medians except for sample sizes.  Data only include information for CEOs.  
Samples sizes are for compensation.  The data are from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP.  (a) In thousands.  (b) In millions. 
 
 Total 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
The CEO               
Salary + bonus(a)      745 
 
483 500 554    576    650    675    672    746    810    810    920 1,008 1,239 
 
 
Total 
compensation(a) 
  1,688 
 
785 854 968 1,036 1,253 1,460 1,574 1,930 2,186 2,345 2,393 2,424 3,036 
 
               
The firm               
Sales(b)      908 
 
599 595 645    707    728    788    834    944 1,053 1,089 1,039 1,136 1,345 
 
 
Assets(b)   1,154 
 
943 754 783    852    862    916    993 1,127 1,308 1,381 1,412 1,555  1,818 
 
 
Market value(b)   1,027  573 603 578    732    813 1,027    947 1,091 1,176 1,273 1,062 1,493  1,816 
   
 
Return on assets 
(%) 
    3.94 
  
3.67 3.99 4.25   4.18   4.52    4.64    4.01    4.30    4.28 2.91    3.14    3.45    4.25 
  
 
N 17,403 678 954 1,040  1,118 1,281 1,388 1,474 1,490 1,496 1,530 1,628 1,676  1,630 
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Table 2.  Pay for performance sensitivities 
 
OLS and quantile regression estimates are included for the following empirical specification:   
itit valuefirmoncompensati )ln()ln( Δ+=Δ τβθ .  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is change in compensation 
(including salary, bonus, and the value of options granted this period as valued by Black-
Scholes).  Data are from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP, 1992-2004, and only include 
information on CEOs. 
 
 
  
OLS 
τ = 0.10 τ = 0.20 τ = 0.30 τ = 0.40 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.60 τ = 0.70 τ = 0.80 τ = 0.90 
 
Δ(firm value)it 
 
0.0673 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.0074 
(0.015) 
 
0.0157 
(0.008) 
 
0.0312 
(0.005) 
 
0.0429 
(0.004) 
 
0.0580 
(0.004) 
 
0.0665 
(0.005) 
 
0.0799 
(0.006) 
 
0.0982 
(0.010) 
 
0.1456 
(0.016) 
R2  0.0114 
 
         
N 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 9,556 
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Table 3.   F statistics for differences in slopes across quantiles 
 
This table reports F statistics for testing across specifications in Table 2.  All combinations are 
significantly different from one another at the 1% level. 
 
 τ = 0.20 τ = 0.30 τ = 0.40 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.60 τ = 0.70 τ = 0.80 Τ = 0.90 
τ = 0.10 6.988 14.628 22.103 28.320 43.685 54.066 80.130 91.950 
τ = 0.20 - 13.033 26.541 37.979 69.623 76.116 134.010 100.510 
τ = 0.30 - - 18.221 33.203 78.564 70.455 153.120 88.732 
τ = 0.40 - - - 17.411 73.810 52.257 147.680 75.269 
τ = 0.50 - - - - 59.803 38.341 127.210 65.976 
τ = 0.60 - - - - - 11.379 70.528 48.315 
τ = 0.70 - - - - - - 19.825 38.540 
τ = 0.80 - - - - - - - 22.471 
 
 
